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Multi asset quarterly webinar
October 2026
In this webinar, Trevor Greetham, Head of Multi Asset at Royal London Asset Management:
- Highlights market activity over the past year and the impact on investors
- Illustrates the current positioning on the investment clock and where he believes the opportunities are for multi asset investors
View transcript
Good afternoon all.
Welcome to our quarterly multi asset webinar.
So my name is Greg Clark.
I'm a Business Development Manager here at RLAM in the London team and I'm joined today by the one and only Mr Trevor Greetham.
Hi Trevor.
If there's only one of me, I can confirm that.
Right, guys.
So in terms of agenda, what we're going to cover today, we'll go through the usual format.
So Trevor will cover off an update on the performance on the funds.
We'll have a little bit of a look at the macro environment out there and then what that means for positioning.
And then we'll finish up with some Q&A.
So please do make sure you put the questions in the chat.
We've already had one actually.
So keep them coming, keep that keenness coming through.
But Trevor, I'm going to hand straight off to you and let's get going.
Ok, thanks everyone.
Ok, so multi asset in times of uncertainty, we're developing portfolios here with the first line of defence against uncertainty, which is diversification and active management.
So we think you should be broadly diversified and ready to respond to changes.
The portfolios that we've designed are there to meet customer needs for accumulation, but also decumulation.
I'll describe to you a robust and repeatable investment process with a long track record.
And we're active on all levels to adapt with the times.
And we like to say there's no such thing as passive in multi asset.
So we have a broad asset class universe.
We're actively managing that tactically on a day-to-day basis, but also through individual security selection.
This is what the fund range looks like.
This is the RLAM global multi asset portfolio range shown here from GMAP Defensive all the way up to GMAP Dynamic Equity.
And as you know, we also have the Governed Portfolio shown here at the bottom, the equivalent names the GP Defensive all the way up to the GP Total Equity.
Effectively what we have across the risk spectrum here are portfolios managed on a consistent basis.
And if you look at that chart from the top right, that's from Trustnet, that's comparing GP Conservative with GMAP Balanced as an example.
And you can see there, the track record for GP Conservative starts back in 2009, 2016, 10 years ago, the GMAPs were launched and the performance is very consistent, not totally identical, but they're managed by the same team with the same investment strategy.
I'm looking at the GMAP performance over one year, three years and five years, looking first and second quartile versus the respective IA sectors over one year and also over five years, in general. Over three years a bit more lagging the peer groups.
And what you'll find is when stocks and bonds are doing really well, we're more diversified then that will lag a little bit.
And I'll show you how that works out over time.
But we believe having the broader diversification gives you the better risk adjusted returns in the end.
If you look at the performance of the Governed Portfolios, again, you're seeing some good performance here in terms of the performance versus the different ARC MPS benchmarks on the left hand side over six months, one year, three years and five years.
And on the right hand side, you're seeing versus the ABI mixed investment period.
So pretty good long run performance here in the post pandemic period.
Because we're looking at five years now, it's from 2021 onwards, so the pandemic recovery and since then it's paid to be more broadly diversified.
The three levels of the active strategy I touched on were the strategic asset allocation where we're diversifying to maximise return for a given level of risk, but we're factoring in sort of medium term calls around things like valuation and emerging threats.
We've got the active security selection either trying to seek additional value or to control things like ESG outcomes.
So we use these carbon tilted equity trackers for example, and a commodity tracker.
And then tactical allocation is the day-to-day job of trying to make sure this overall mix adapts as the business environment changes and change it does.
This is the patchwork quilt we call it of asset class returns.
These are all the asset classes we include in the GMAPs and Governed Portfolios.
And this shows you the calendar year performances and year to date in sterling terms reinvesting income.
And the first thing that jumps off the page at you is there's no real pattern here.
You get some asset classes which are top one year and bottom the next year and that purple square which is the sort of multi asset blend here again I think for the balanced or conservative risk point, it's never at the top, it's never at the bottom.
The thing I would draw out here is how different we were in years like 2020 and also actually relatively different in 2023/4 when you had a big streak of performance in global stocks.
And most of the peer groups we're compared to will just have stocks and bonds as their two main asset classes.
So years like 2020, when stocks are up 15% and gilts are up 8%, you're going to get a return somewhere between 8% and 15%, depending on your risk level.
Our mix was up 7, so it was below the range from the passive balanced funds.
And we underperformed quite significantly in 2020.
But the broader diversification, the inflation resilience came through in spades in 2021 and especially 2022.
So 2 years in a row with commodities returning 30%.
And then in 2022, your passive balance funds were blending a -8 for global stocks with a -24 from gilts and again, 23/4 for another burst of equity performance.
But 25/6 suddenly commodities are up there again.
And just looking at commodities here back to 2016, I'm counting 1,2, 3, 4 years, we've had roughly 30% return from commodities.
The average return from commodities over the decade has been 7 or 8% per annum compound, which is quite similar to UK equities at 10.
Global equities have been 15% per annum compound and that isn't normal.
That's higher than you would expect equities to to return.
And it's reflecting very strong earnings outcomes in the US and an expansion of valuation.
And I would suggest people shouldn't get used to 15% compound returns. Bonds over this period looking at gilts, the annualised return over 10 years is just 0.4%.
So the big disappointment has been bonds, gilts and big positive surprise versus the previous decade has been commodities and that fits in with what we think is happening in the world around inflation.
So the unique asset mix that we run here is a combination of three big themes that are different in terms of our strategic asset allocation.
We include real assets like property and commodities.
We diversify the equity exposure more, particularly with a valuation tilt around UK equities and we diversify the fixed income exposure more.
So we think we're in this new, new era of what I called a few years ago, spikeflation.
Now you've probably heard this from me quite a few times by now, so I'll sort of be brief, but the graph goes back to 1914, shows you UK inflation and you can see World War 1, World War 2, the 1970s where inflation spiked very high and it came back to more normal levels in between those price level shocks.
But you've got these distinct spikes.
We saw the post-COVID spike and we were suggesting for the reasons on the right hand side of the slide here that we thought we were entering into a more inflation prone era.
And with what's going on with Iran and oil, I think we're in that second spike of inflation potentially this winter.
The main drivers of that new regime, which are really very different to the 80s and the 90s and the early 2000s are the chronic, the chronic commodity underinvestment, the deglobalization, the massive levels of debt and geopolitics.
So in short, that's those are the real problem areas.
And those debt levels mean that central banks will let inflation overshoot without fighting too hard.
We saw that after the pandemic.
If you've got a passive balance solution, then inflation can be a problem when it hits you.
So this is looking at US data.
And it's because the, the scatter on the left hand side was something I saw on LinkedIn from a big passive house and they were saying they've only been four years since I think 1928 when both US stocks and US bonds lost you money and 2022 was one of them.
What I do on the right hand side of the screen is I take the same dots and I just cast them into real terms after inflation.
So because inflation is almost always positive, all of those dots kind of migrate towards the sort of southwest of your screen.
And suddenly there aren't just four years when stocks and bonds failed to keep their their capital value.
There are loads of years when in real terms that stocks and bonds both failed you.
And if you look at the the labels on them, they're years like the mid 70s or the late 80s or 2022.
They're the inflation, inflation spike years.
So this builds around to why we include real assets like commodities and property.
On the left hand side, you've got commodity returns based on inflation regime.
And as you'd expect, when inflation is higher, you get better returns from commodities.
They're a real time inflation hedge.
On the right hand side, you've got a comparison of property returns with equities.
Now property and equities are both kind of real assets.
They're both there to generate you growth above inflation.
But people are quite surprised when they see this chart because property has kept pace with equities over the long run, rather better than you might expect.
Most people's assumptions are property returns.
This is commercial property, not REITs.
Should be somewhere between bonds and stocks.
And yet whenever there's a big setback in equity markets, it's like the hare and the tortoise.
Property typically just keeps chugging on.
So in 87, when the 87 crash happened, property took the lead.
When the .com crash happened, property took the lead.
Property was actually slightly ahead of both UK and global stocks as late as 2022.
The mini budget caused a 20% drop in in the UK commercial property market and it's recovering from that now.
So stocks are again ahead.
But if you imagine we enter into, we'll come to this towards the end of this webinar possibility out there somewhere of a .com style bear market on valuation grounds for equities.
UK property doesn't care less what's happening to you know US tech stock valuations.
As long as there's not a UK financial crisis or recession, you'd expect property again to do the hare and tortoise thing and keep plodding on giving you sort of 5% ish returns as equity markets come down.
So we really believe in both of these asset classes and those are our key differentiators.
Within the equities, we're more diversified and that's partly on value and resilience grounds.
So if you look at cycle adjusted valuations like we're seeing on the left hand side of your screen, the US is trading at 40 times earnings, the UK is about 20 times earnings, but it's the buy one, get one free stock market.
The UK's valuation is in line with its long run average, whereas in the US you've got this massive surge in earnings which is causing the these sort of very high valuations when you're looking at cycle adjusted earnings.
Last time we saw these levels of valuations was briefly in late 2021 before the stock market correction and then prior to that in the .com bubble. Interestingly the .com bubble have also involved European equities.
The purple line on here, the dark purple line is European equities and it was a European telcos which were were bubbly in 99.
So it was the US technology stocks and the European telecom stocks.
This time around it's the US technology stocks.
And I guess places like Korea and Taiwan are involved because the semiconductors are part of the sort of selling shovels and the gold rush kind of earnings boom.
But having a bit of extra UK exposure gives you a bit of a valuation protection against the bear market and it gives you a bit of resilience against inflation as well because the UK market tends to do better when inflation is higher.
I said we're more diversified on the bonds side.
If you'd looked at the portfolios in 2020 or 2021, one thing you'd have really noticed we had, we had very low duration exposure and then the fixed income element across all of the portfolios, we had cash basically and people would say to us, why have you got that cash?
You know your passive balanced funds don't have any cash.
They've got all that money invested in bonds if it's not in stocks.
What you ended up with, there was a slightly ludicrous position in 2020 when the real yield on UK index linked bonds had got to lower than -2. So you have to think about that one carefully.
If you're lending the government money at a -2% real yield, they're the borrower, right?
They should be paying you interest.
Effectively you're paying them 2% a year to please look after my money.
Bonds had no longer were no longer the risk free return in a portfolio.
They were return free risk.
Gilts got down to a 0.09% 10 year yield.
Inflation was going to come back.
So we had very low bond exposure.
We've actually been strategically adding to bonds.
Tactically is another matter.
We tactically we're still a bit cautious.
We think the yields could go higher still in the short term, but strategically now real yields are positive and they're more than plus 2%.
Our most recent strategic changes have been adding back from cash back into duration.
So government bonds, they get a lot of bad press, right, but the yields are higher and high yields are good.
It's a good entry point.
So we think government bonds have got decent value.
We're a little bit more concerned about spread product in general.
So credit in general because spreads are really very tight.
So we've got credit exposure.
We like to diversify as broadly as we can.
So recent changes have done things like moving money out of global high yield which is quite exposed to US borrowers and that's where some of the Super scalar borrowing is happening into European asset backed high yield.
So we've got a need to diversify credit and we're not actually pushing the boat out on credit.
We don't.
We haven't got a tactical position credit.
A picture tells 1000 words.
So what I'm doing here is comparing a straw man of a passive balanced 60/40 fund on the left hand side with the equivalent Governed Portfolio or GMAP Growth portfolio on the right hand side.
They're both in the same risk bucket, about a 10% expected annual volatility.
On the left hand side, you're not very diversified.
You've got £100 from your customer and you just put £40 of it in North America and £40 of it in the bond market.
You know, yeah, OK, there'll be years like 2020 when they both make you good money, but it doesn't feel like you've really diversified.
You've got £2 in UK equities, which wouldn't buy you a coffee.
On the right hand side.
You've got our equivalent more diversified mix.
We don't need 60 in in equities because we've got property as a sort of hybrid asset class, but there's equity like in some respects.
So we've got 55 in equities, not 60.
We've got the North America exposure.
You've got the strong earnings growth over there.
So we've got £25 of your 100 in North America, about £12 in the UK.
You've got the property there at about 11. £5 in commodities as a hedge against inflation and generally still a bit less duration exposure than the peer group in terms of that dark purple bond exposure.
So that's our kind of active approach to strategic asset allocation and and versus a sort of passive balance balanced comparator you you would say maybe a bit over half of our risk comes from those strategic differences.
The other half of it comes from tactical asset allocation or security selection.
So let me move on to that.
In terms of security selection, you can see a list of different equity or property or real asset funds we're using mostly Royal London funds.
We've got a lot of good equity funds, very broad sweep of fixed income funds.
On the commodity side, we're using either external exchange traded funds or using swaps to get that commodity exposure.
And of course property, you've actually got to go out there and buy buildings and do them up and find tenants and collect rent and all that hard work.
And we've got a, you know, very large property department within Royal London doing that for us.
It's not an asset class you can even do passively.
On the tactical allocation side. We have a daily process, so we're assessing the risks and we're making usually pretty small incremental adjustments on a daily basis, which can really add up over a period of a week or two when things are changing.
So we start with a a range of different quantitative models that include the factors that we think can help you make a good investment decision.
We feed those through our daily team meeting and generally the loudest voice in the room should be the models or should be the research that helps to avoid behavioural traps.
But once in a while there'll be things you'll do where you'll override and you'll say, well, actually something is happening a bit differently that we need to control a little bit.
So for example, we were talking about it just a few minutes ago.
Actually on the team back when the Iran war started, the models built up a very long equity position as the stock market dipped, which actually worked out all right.
We didn't take such a a big equity position at that time because there was a fan chart of things that could have happened and there were some quite bad outcomes out there.
So again, we'll sort of risk, risk assess what's coming from the models and sometimes do slightly different things.
The first among equals of the different frameworks is the investment clock, which is a way of trying to link tactical asset allocation to the business cycle.
And this is something I started working on in the 1990s.
There's a reference to the investment clock from the 1930s.
And the idea that, you know, human, human experience moves in cycles is a really ancient idea.
So it's not surprising that you see cycles in financial markets.
And we think the two key drivers of these cycles are what's happening to growth and inflation.
So the first stage of your cycle there is when growth is weak and inflation is dropping and you've got spare capacity, central banks cutting rates, government bonds usually do well.
That dark purple bit, the recovery is where you've got an economic recovery but still low or falling inflation, interest rates falling.
That's when you get the best stock market returns, quite often 20% or so in real terms.
The overheat is when you've got strong growth and rising inflation.
Bonds are selling off, but stocks might still be doing well.
But there's a bit of a tug of war between rising interest rates and earnings that should be familiar
At the moment there's a big tug of war between the rising bond yields and the strong earnings numbers.
Usually commodities are the best asset class and overheat.
And again, they're up 30% year to date.
And then stagflation is where you get a slow down with rising inflation and it's a time to be defensive.
But quite often the stagflation is caused by commodities, Middle East shocks, that kind of thing.
So again, commodities are part of that portfolio.
This is based on analysis going back to the mid 70s.
So all the numbers in the table are average annual returns after inflation in the four different stages of the business cycle with the benefit of hindsight, seeing where the peaks and the troughs are in growth.
The investment clock isn't the only factor we look at in our attached class allocation and just flashing up a range of different factors.
It's a fundamental factor.
But for regional equities, for example, it's earnings remissions from analysts which we use as that fundamental factor.
We have valuation factors and we have technical factors.
Where are we on the clock at the moment?
Well.
Growth indicators have been a little bit negative compared to a year or two ago, but they're beginning to perk up a little bit.
That's the left hand side of your screen.
The dark purple line there is global GDP growth, which has been actually pretty stable since the pandemic.
We're now more than six years into an economic expansion.
The average size of length of business cycle is five years in total.
So again, this is quite a long expansion and we saw quite a long expansion before that.
You can see it on the screen there.
We had a 10 year expansion with a few bumps along the way after the financial crisis.
So you know, we're sort of seeing the steady, steady expansion, some signs of maybe growth picking up.
On the right hand side, we've got our inflation lead indicator.
Again, this is the same sort of graph where the lead indicator is pushed forward by six months.
The charts start round about the time of the financial crisis and you can see how good our inflation indicators were at predicting the spike in inflation that happened after the pandemic.
At the moment, there's there sort of a bit mixed.
You think there'll be more inflation indicators out there.
But if oil stays at $100, it's year on year impact is 0.
You've got to get higher oil prices to get more inflation coming through and we may yet see that.
It's all summed up on the investment clock.
Now those of you who've followed these webinars over the years who have seen a slightly different diagram and slightly different colouring, and this is the first sort of facelift the investment clock has had in about a decade.
What we've done here is, again, it's the usual story where in the middle of the diagram you've got the readings of our monthly growth and inflation indicators.
That orange blob says we're in stagflation.
The rings on this are the different asset classes.
So the middle ring there is the broad asset classes. Stocks, commodities, bonds and cash.
The next ring out is equity sectors and it's fixed income sectors and types of commodity.
So where we stand at the moment, you know, the the growth picture had weakened over the last year or so.
Inflation has picked up over the last year or so.
So we're down in stagflation.
Things don't always move clockwise.
You can see the last 12 months there's been a lot of movement here and there.
Some of the investment clock indicators are driven by what you might call the Donald Trump cycle.
So when Donald Trump starts a war, ends a war, it's affecting your inflation, which is left to right.
When he, when he announced all the tariffs, there was a drop in business confidence.
So there's a lot of stuff that gets fed into all of this that the markets trying to process.
But at the moment it's actually saying be a little bit careful because we're in the stagflation corner.
And that's usually when stocks don't do that well, it's one of our factors.
Earnings revisions are strongly positive for stocks.
And so, you know, if you like the investment clock is saying temper your optimism because growth is looking a bit soft, inflation is rising, and central banks are hiking interest rates.
This morning, I was talking to our economists and they think actually we might be heading to the top, right.
In other words, rather than going clockwise, we might just go north because the growth indicators are starting to get a bit stronger.
And you could call this animal spirits around the AI boom, but we're at $100 oil and yet business confidence in the US is at a five year high.
So we could find actually we reaccelerate that top right hand corner overheat bad for bonds and it's when central banks have to hike.
So we could be in a normal hiking cycle here with all the tug of war we talked about earlier on growth versus valuations.
Oil is still quite constrained.
There aren't many ships getting through the Strait of Hormuz.
There's a lot of theory out there that little ships are getting through and refilling big ships off the coast of Oman.
So there is oil coming out of the Gulf.
But clearly there are some risks around what happens next.
There's another carrier group being sent to the Middle East as we speak.
Donald Trump is saying something about after the midterms, there's going to be another big bout of warfare.
Hard to know whether that's the art of the deal and he's trying to get around to cut him a deal before the midterms to bring gasoline prices down.
But I think he's actually got to the stage now where he realises they're not really listening.
So clearly oil is a big thing to watch and it affects the bond market.
And I kind of, I kind of find it sort of grimly amusing how every time there's a move up or down in gilt yields or French bond yields or US treasury yields or any government bond yield you like, all the commentary you read is about politicians said this, politicians said that.
This graph shows you UK bond yields in purple, US bond yields in turquoise.
And you can see that vertical line is the the date the US and Israel started attacking Iran.
And it just changed the world.
Since the Iran war started.
We've got an extra percent on guilt yields, an extra percent on treasury yields.
And it's because of the inflation impact of the war.
If you look at what people were expecting from central banks, the turquoise bars on this bar chart show you the expectation over 2026 for central banks.
And the expectation was the Fed, the US central bank would cut rates the -59 means minus 0.59%.
So two quarter point rate cuts were expected.
What have we got?
We've had one hike and we're expecting another two over the next year.
The Bank of England was expected to cut rates twice, and now they're expected to raise rates.
The ECB was expected, if anything, to cut rates, but now they're raising rates.
The Bank of Japan was already hiking rates, but it's hiking rates faster.
It's not hard to figure out what this is about.
This is about the war, about the inflation impact from rising oil prices.
There's not been a big change in fiscal policy in the last six months in this country or in any other country.
But it is true that higher bond yields make things more difficult for governments because there's a cost of financing to factor in.
There's no doubt this is putting the thumbscrews onto one government finances.
But government finances did not cause the bond sell off.
It was the war. But we have to to to roll with that.
The war has the potential to create a recession, but at the moment the world economy is is managing to tolerate $100 oil quite well.
This graph looks at the oil price in real terms back to the 70s.
And although you see quite big gyrations here in some recessions, so shaded vertical bars, some recessions caused by oil price shocks.
I mean, one of the things that's interesting is over this period in real terms, the oil price hasn't really gone up.
So it's been pretty steady actually.
It's a massive variation, right?
But it's a sideways graph.
You can see the Iran war on there in in percentage change terms isn't as big as the Ukraine invasion shock or either of the 1970s shocks to date.
But there is a possibility of a downside risk if oil prices get really out of control.
Something to watch.
And also we need to be watching diesel because refinery capacity is very clogged up at the moment.
So diesel prices are looking higher than crude oil prices are.
So we've got downside risks, but of course we've also got upside risks.
And the upside risks mainly come from the US earnings machine.
This graph looks at the outperformance of US equities in turquoise since the financial crisis.
And it's described by or explained by the outperformance of earnings.
So the purple line here is earnings per share growth of the US versus the world.
And the US has outperformed because it's outearned other stock markets.
That sort of wedge between the two, that widening white space between the two is getting more expensive. The US is getting more expensive as well.
Interesting, since the Trump tariffs, the US has actually been sideways versus the world.
Even though earnings are still doing really well, the market's not reflecting that in our performance.
And some of that's the dollar and some of that is a tendency to look at these higher and higher earnings numbers and try and look through them.
And we have to think quite carefully about whether the earnings numbers are sustainable because those of us have been in the markets for a few decades, have experienced a few bubbles along our along our way.
I'm sure many people listening will sort of be nodding along.
This is my bubbles chart.
And every few years I add another one to it.
So I've been working on this since the mid 90s and the mid 90's the bubble that was deflating was Japan.
So all of these to explain what you're looking at are charts of equity sectors or regions versus the world in relative terms, rebased to 100 at the bubble peak with the exception of index linked gilts that's just shown there in absolute terms.
And MAG 7, which we don't know is peaked yet.
I put this graph together in early 2025.
I haven't, I haven't actually had to redraw the scale yet.
So since December 24, MAG 7 stocks are actually not outperforming the world.
It looks a little bit like the kind of tops you see on some of the other charts, but the jury is obviously still out on that one.
But all the others, one bubble burst and another bubble started.
So the Japan bubble burst in 1990.
In 1990, Japan was the world's largest stock market.
It was about 50% of the world index would you believe?
The British Embassy in Tokyo, one square mile of central Tokyo, was worth more than the state of California?
So Japan went badly wrong, Tighter monetary policies what bursts that bubble and you can see it underperformed by 80% over the next 10 years.
But as Japan's bubble burst, the Asian tigers took over.
The Asian tigers were Malaysia, the Indonesia, Thailand.
These were these were, were stock markets that were based on economies which had a US dollar peg and they were importing cheap US interest rates and building capital stock.
And eventually they built too much industry and too much property, too much corruption and the currency pegs broke and you saw this massive devaluation.
So the Asian tigers lost you 90% relative in the Asia crisis of 97.
Well, never fear, there's always a new bubble to inflate.
The orange one was the dot coms.
And you can see that US technology or or I should say global technology versus the world peaks in March of 2000 came down very, very sharply.
Now, I was working at an investment bank at that time.
And if I said sceptical things about technology or dot coms in late 99 or early 2000, I would get shouted at.
You walk across this trading floor and the Merrill Lynch trading floors the size of a football field full of traders and they would yell things at me like here comes the dinosaur.
And I bet you use a typewriter and all this kind of thing.
And it was it was hard to be bearish on technology in 2000 When the .com bubble burst, the mining analysts were suddenly the heroes.
And you know, BHP Billiton and Anglo American were the hot stocks because China was building cities.
That green line which is mining versus the world could equally well be Chinese GDP growth.
So China massively accelerated every year.
Shanghai was building a New Boston skyline and it was sucking in commodities.
And then the financial crisis came along and mining went takes growth.
But after the financial crisis, there was a new asset class that went pro growth, which was bonds suddenly had zero interest rates.
And if you were a long duration bond investment like index linked gilts, you went through the roof until 2022 came along.
So gilts, index linked gilts.
This is the all maturities index, I think.
Yeah, no, it's not.
It's the long one.
It's the 25 year plus index linked gilt index.
You've lost 70% of your money since 2022 and it's not coming back.
And then you've got MAG 7.
So is it a bubble?
I don't know.
All of these other bubbles were burst by monetary tightening of one kind or another.
And we are starting, and I hesitate to big this up too much, starting to see monetary tightening in the US.
If you can see this, this graph, the purple line is the federal funds rate.
And you've got that one little rate hike from Kevin Walsh.
And that's all we've seen so far.
I was reading a piece of research this morning from a friend who was predicting 1 to 2% of interest rate rises in the US over the next year or so, which would be more actually than we saw in 1999.
And arguably that was what burst the .com bubble.
So I don't want to sound too bearish here because tactically by showing our tactical positions, which are our shorter term positions, we're overweight stocks moderately tempered by the investment clock.
We're also overweight commodities.
So it's a bit of a barbell.
And within the stock exposure, we're overweight US, Japanese and emerging market equities which are benefiting from the technology boom.
So at the moment we're still kind of playing the technology boom and we're also along the commodities.
But be careful, don't be too greedy.
Diversification is still worth it.
It's worth only having the £25 in North America, not the £40 in North America.
On that note, let me let me take some questions.
Perfect.
Well, that was really interesting, Trevor, thank you very much.
Thank you.
We've had a couple of questions on downside risk.
I mean, the thing that I think I've noticed going into that presentation is that there's a lot of opportunity out there.
This AI boom potentially has still got more to run.
There's more upside and and you talked about at the start as well, 15% compound, compound returns from global equities that people probably have got used to.
That hasn't been the case before.
Maybe people are falling into there's plenty more room enough to go in this AI boom.
But there is, you paint the picture of the fact that there's a lot of risk out there as well and the that bubble could burst.
We also have the potential risk of this conflict in Iran dragging on and inflation pushing high at prior because of oil and gas prices.
So you talk about diversification.
Yeah, just let's talk about that in the context of managing downside risk, but also participating in the upside.
Just you've kind of broadly covered it in everything you've said, but if you could just come back that down so that people know how you're doing that.
Yeah.
One, one of the first question we have is about the grips which the retirement income portfolios and what we're doing about managing downside risk in those.
So, so I would say again that the main ways we try and manage downside risk are through diversification and active management.
So the fact we've got the the commercial property, we've got the sort of tilt towards the UK market which is a bit more value driven.
That ought to give us some resilience if there were a technology focused sell off and the active management in terms of the tactical asset allocation can move quite a long way and a similar process I was running during the financial crisis.
We, we went underweight equities in July of, no actually December of 2007 and we didn't go long again until March, April 2009.
So we were underweight for 18 months.
So the tactical asset allocation can help to protect some downside as well.
It's only mitigating the risk.
You're still likely to see a drop in portfolios and that kind of environment, but broad diversification and active management, those are the two things I would focus particularly in the accumulation.
And I guess that's your point about bonds now as well.
You're getting a bit of protection from your yield as well relatively as well.
You are, you know, if you're buying a bond yielding 5% and it keeps yielding 5%, you make a 5% return, you know, that's, that's, that's worth having.
Yeah, absolutely.
There's just a question on how quickly we can change your equity positions as well.
I guess that ties back to being a true active manager.
You talked about you have those daily tactical asset allocation meetings.
How quickly can you move portfolios if you need to?
Yeah.
So, so we can change the equity positions pretty quickly.
I mean, we tend to be incremental on a daily basis, but we can use the futures in the funds to raise, raise cash effectively very quickly.
So we don't have to sell any equities, we can just short futures.
So we have tactical overlays in the funds, which means on a daily basis we can adjust and react quickly.
Perfect.
Thanks, Trevor.
Look, we are coming up against time and I know there's a couple of questions that we haven't got to yet, but we will come back and answer all of these.
I do think it's important considering where we are in the year.
Our next quarterly webinar would have gone through the UK Autumn Budget and we do just touch on that.
Do we think that that's likely to be, how's that coming into your thinking for the the portfolios?
Is that going to be a damp squid?
Because there's no headroom for the government to spend and the the bond markets won't let them borrow more.
It's obviously they talk about the triple lock pensions proposal being being cut.
So what's your view and is that impacting the way you're thinking?
Yeah, well, I think we've got a lot of the announcements in the Labour Party conference speech from Andy Burnham.
So, so we talked a bit there about the triple lock, which I think is still a triple lock, by the way.
So it's, it's now inflation and 2.5% with earnings assessed over a longer time frame.
And I, I heard that and I thought this is actually quite intelligent because one of the problems with the triple lock as it is currently still is, is that you get paid out as a pensioner if there's an inflation spike and you get paid out if there's a spike in wages.
And what happened to half of the pandemic is one year there was an inflation spike and you got paid out and the next year there was a catch up.
It was a catch up in wages.
It wasn't wages sort of doing things extra.
It's just the same thing basically happened in the next year in wages and you got paid out again.
So what's, what's made the triple lock expensive is spikeflation.
When inflation spikes one year and wages spike the next year it just doesn't echo you got paid twice.
And the OBR was saying this is an expensive policy.
So what they've said is it's about wages over a more smooth period and it's just inflation and prices in the short term.
I think he's actually trying to say he's trying to do what the spirit of the triple lock was.
So I don't think that's going to affect things too much.
And I think what's going to become really interesting is the reopening of the Brexit debate because there's a fiscal, there's a fiscal hole caused by the economy being smaller in the OBR report.
So they've got a 4% GDP shortfall cumulative, which you could get some of that back and that will create headroom.
But I think the budget itself might be a bit of a damp squid because the announcements have been upfront and all this sort of Brexit stuff is very slow moving.
Yeah.
And I think that could be a webinar on its own just covering that.
So it could, it could well be.
It has been in the past.
I'm sure it will be again.
Right.
We are we're coming out of time.
One final key takeaway for clients from you, Trevor.
What?
What would you be putting you on the spot?
Yeah, well, I think don't put all your eggs in one basket.
It's very tempting when you've got all this bubble talk to get sort of sucked in.
But it's interesting that Mag 7 has not been outperforming.
So. So even with all of this hysteria around earnings, just keep things broadly spread.
You want some exposure to the things which are booming, but you don't want to lose your shirt if it's a bubble.
I liked bubbly as you talked about with the European telcos earlier on.
Well, thank you all for dialling in and thank you Trevor for that.
That was really useful.
Just so you're all aware, we are in the middle of our multi asset road shows at the moment.
If you want to hear any more about those, then please do reach out to your relationship manager.
But for now, thank you for dialling in and we'll see you all next time.
Thank you.
Multi asset quarterly video
October 2026
In his latest video update, Trevor Greetham, Head of Multi Asset at Royal London Asset Management, gives an overview of what's been going on in markets and considers the impact of current markets on the positioning of the Investment Clock. He also provides a short-term outlook.
View transcript
The multi asset funds that we manage are overweight equities with a particular focus on the parts of the world benefiting from the AI boom.
So that's US equities, emerging market equities in Japan and we're also overweight commodities and energy stocks.
Bit of a barbell strategy. The investment clock that geyser asset allocation is currently in stagflation.
That means you you've got signs of weak activity, but with rising inflation. And that's really triggered primarily by what's been happening in the Middle East with oil prices.
Now that ordinarily would be a time to be relatively cautious on stocks.
But the other factors we look at things like the trend in corporate earnings are very supportive.
So we end up with a moderately overweight position in equities.
And then we have this barbell strategy on where we're long the technology plays, but at the same time long energy.
And this seems like a bit of a contradiction in terms because in a way what we're seeing superimposed is a 1990s style technology boom and a 1970s style Middle East oil shock.
And it's possible for both to be happening at the same time as each other.
We're underweight government bonds because the government bonds are really suffering partly from the strength of activity in the world economy and partly from the fear of rising inflation and central bank rate rises.
That's where we are right now.
We're keeping an eye on things quite carefully as always.
You're beginning to see central banks raise interest rates, and if they end up through the next year or so having to raise interest rates quite significantly, you could be setting the scenes for an economic downturn, at which point it would make sense to become more defensive and maybe buy some of those bonds with the high yields.
We're not there yet.
We're in the early stages of tightening, but that's something that we'll be monitoring carefully and using our investment clock to show us if that starts to become the base case.
Investing in an uncertain world webinar
April 2026
Events in the Middle East raise the risk of recession, point to higher-than-expected inflation in the coming months and could mean delays in expected rate cuts; raising the risk of rate hikes. For now, things remain uncertain.
In this webinar, Royal London Asset Management's Trevor Greetham (Head of Multi Asset) and Melanie Baker (Senior Economist) discuss recent events and the impact on markets.
View transcript
Hello and welcome to the multi-asset webinar on the 1st of April, 2026. My name is Lucy Dean and I sit within the wealth team covering the North of the UK. I'm joined today by Trevor Greetham, the head of our multi-asset team, and Melanie Baker, our senior economist. Today's session will cover recent events, their impacts on markets, and why diversification has never been more relevant.
We'll have a chance to answer questions at the end, so please send them through the portal. And with that, I will hand over to Melanie.
Thanks, Lucy. Alright. So, look, I don't know what's going to happen here any more than anyone else, but the economic effect will be worse the longer the conflict continues.
Do you think that, like, brief spikes in energy prices can leave very little mark on the global economy, more prolonged spikes and things get more damaging. And at the outset, I just want to point out that this crisis is already about more than just oil and gas prices. They know the disruption to trade routes is causing issues for the supply of all sorts of commodities.
And for me, things like the impact on fertiliser costs and availability is a particular concern, meaning essentially higher food prices down the line on top of any impact already had on that sector from higher energy and transport costs. So, big picture: energy shocks lead to higher inflation and lower growth. What happens to interest rates is a little less straightforward.
Right this first chart just gives a crude indication of where you might expect the energy components of CPI to go if oil and gas prices stay where they are. So, in this case, it's a very crude exercise that suggests energy inflation would move from slightly negative to perhaps 20% year on year. And, you know, with weights in the inflation basket of 5% to 10% in different economies — major economies.
Then you're looking at a crude approximation of an inflation impact of 1% to 2% higher. That shouldn't be much of a surprise if we get there. Another reasonable place to start, I think, are rules of thumb. So we can look at some of the scenario analysis and research done by central banks and other institutions on the impact of higher oil and gas prices on output growth.
So GDP and inflation and, you know, again, rising energy commodity prices look set to harm economic growth and drive up inflation at a global level. So the IMF have noted that a sustained 10% rise in oil prices could boost inflation by perhaps 0.4 percentage points. So a 10% rise in oil prices, would boost inflation by 0.4 percentage points and lower global growth by a tenth to two-tenths.
So if you kind of extrapolate that to the size of the recent increase in prices, then you're looking at maybe inflation boosted by perhaps two percentage points and GDP hit by maybe half a percentage point to 1%. Global growth overall is only about 3%, so that's the run rate. So, yes, it could be a significant hit and enough to take you perhaps to at least a threshold of recession.
So maybe focusing more on the US, Euro area, the UK. First of all, you might expect a little bit more of a modest impact on the US economy because the US is, of course, a substantial oil producer. We looked at some Fed research which suggests, perhaps on the current level of oil prices, more like a 0.8% rise in inflation.
And perhaps a 0.2 percentage point hit to GDP, So a bit lower than those initial estimates. On the Euro area, you'd expect maybe a bigger impact because they're a major oil and gas importer. And again, we looked at some ECB analysis. Maybe then you're looking at more like a 1.5 percentage point hit on higher inflation and three-tenths lower GDP growth.
So, at least these are reasonable starting assumptions. For the UK, then you might get slightly bigger effects again. And perhaps the shock to date could be more like two and a half percentage points higher inflation and half a percentage point hit to GDP. Actually, even in the UK, that's not obviously quite enough to kind of plunge you into recession
but again, you can sort of skirt the edges there — at least a sort of technical recession even with those impacts. But you want to be really careful with any of these sorts of models and impacts. The different approaches are available, other estimates are available, other models, clearly. And I think the other point is, again, coming back to those initial points — if the conflict suddenly calms down, these are going to be overestimates.
On the other hand, with strains being seen in refined products and other things, the impact could end up larger. And clearly the impact also depends on how governments and central banks respond to this Energy crisis — it's a really important aspect. Government subsidies, as we've seen already, for example, in Japan, could soften the impact on consumers.
And if this conflict continues, it wouldn't be surprising at all to see more temporary subsidies, tax cuts, other support programmes to at least support the most vulnerable consumers. Okay, but what about central banks and prospects for rate hikes? So we've now had at least inflation data for March from the Euro area. So here on the right-hand side chart, you can see that local headline CPI line in purple already starting to come up.
And that reflects the initial jump in energy inflation. That's just really the petrol and diesel price impact. I'm sure you've all noticed prices rising quickly at the pump, already very responsive to oil price changes. What central banks will be particularly alert to in coming months is all those other lines — signs of increases in core inflation, services inflation, pay growth, inflation expectations.
It's passing through more broadly. Okay, let's think quickly about the different central banks. I'll put Japan to one side. Before the conflict, I was expecting them to kind of raise rates gradually; I'm still pretty much expecting them to raise rates gradually. Coming into the conflict on the Fed side, the US Fed was expected to cut rates two to three times this year.
The Bank of England were expected to cut rates twice this year. The ECB was broadly expected to keep rates on hold. Now you look at things — markets and price hikes from the ECB and the Bank of England were no longer pricing in cuts for the US. I mean, think about Europe first. I don't think it would be very surprising if we saw what I would call insurance hikes in Europe — by which I mean one to two rate hikes designed to reduce the chance that we get stuck in a kind of higher inflation norm.
All those other lines and that kind of chart going up significantly. I think it's easy to see why central banks worry about inflation persistence — that period of high inflation that we put up with during the pandemic. You can see on the charts there — it's a really fresh memory for us all. And given the price level hasn't fallen back, things still feel much more expensive than they used to.
Then against that backdrop, there are risks that firms just find it easier to pass on higher costs to consumers than pre-pandemic. And so inflation expectations are at risk of rising. And even wage growth in this context —employees may perhaps now be expected to be compensated for cost of living shocks to at least a greater degree than they were pre-pandemic.
So to contain those risks, it makes sense for inflation-targeting central banks to at least consider precautionary insurance rate rises if energy costs don't fall back. In the Bank of England's case, inflation dynamics were stronger — for example in the Euro area, you can see that on the chart — going into this crisis, and worries about inflation persistence were already pretty prominent.
What about the Fed rate hikes? Look, rate hikes at least look less likely in response to this energy shock than they do in Europe. The Fed's dual mandate does put them in a bit of a different position. But even the Fed was already alert to upside inflation risks. And in comments this week, Powell said that the Fed is inclined to look past the energy price shock.
But five years of above-target inflation means that they can't take for granted that inflation expectations won't rise. But for now, the Fed's messaging has been pointing more towards delayed cuts, than hikes. A slide here shows the PMI business surveys which we do have for March. The right-hand side chart there is the PMI business survey indicator for output prices.
So reflecting that businesses are increasingly saying they'll have to raise prices. So you're back in that case for insurance rate hikes again. On the left-hand side, you can already see a general worsening there in the activity indicator. And in the middle you can see the one for employment has deteriorated too. In particular, look at the UK — it was already really quite weak, standing out against other economies.
It's got a little bit weaker. More generally, that is the danger I think — that policymakers focus on fighting the last battle. So again, fresh in their minds is going to be 2022. Inflation rose a lot; sharp rate rises followed. But maybe tightening policy now would reduce the risks of that scenario.
But again, economies like the UK that haven't been growing very much, sitting with soft labour markets, maybe means they're going to have to cut rates. I think rate cuts would look more likely down the line. With that, I'll happily hand over to Trevor.
Great, okay. So I'm going to put this in a bit of longer-term context, but then I'm going to come back to how you might want to think about the various scenarios over the next few weeks as well. So, 'Spikeflation' and the Iran War. If you look at the chart on the left-hand side of your screen — where Mel's charts were for the last five years — this is the last 110 years.
Okay. So slightly more long-term context here. That left-hand chart shows you in purple, US RPI retail price inflation back to 1915. And what I've done there is I've shaded in those vertical grey bars — periods of high inflation. And that turquoise line is the price level. So, you can see sometimes it's rising gradually, as we saw from sort of 1980 to the time of the pandemic.
And sometimes it's rising more steeply, as we saw in the 1970s, as we saw around World War Two and as we saw during World War One. And you can see I've also shaded in the period from the pandemic onwards, and you can see that steeper rise in the price level that we're seeing. So, the point to make about that left-hand chart — certainly in the UK historical record...
In the US — I've looked at Ireland, I've looked at Germany — the major developed economies: high inflation is almost always spiky inflation. When inflation is high it's unpredictable. You don't get 7% followed by 7% followed by 7%. You get 20% followed by 1%, followed by 2%, followed by 15%. And what that's really saying is that high inflation historically has come in the form of price level shocks.
On the right-hand side of the screen, you've got a list of different factors we've been talking about really since the pandemic onwards, of why we think we've moved from a low, stable inflation paradigm to a spiky inflation paradigm. And it starts with the Covid stimulus in the pandemic. So number one on the dial there at the top left — we had wartime levels of fiscal and monetary stimulus.
In a supply-constrained economy, the stimulus was left in place as the economy was reopening, and that resulted in the old-fashioned too much money chasing too few goods, and you got prices rising very rapidly. That played into number two, which is chronic commodity underinvestment. I've been a commodity investor in multi-asset funds for more than 20 years. Most of that time you had excess capacity bearing down on prices and things like the discovery of US shale.
But recently you've had a period of underinvestment, really since the financial crisis, and the fossil fuel underinvestment has been increased by the transition to net zero. So you've had this period of basically tight commodity supply. That means that when you get a demand shock or an interruption to supply, prices in commodity markets can move very rapidly higher.
Then we move on to de-globalisation. That can include everything from Brexit to the breakdown of NAFTA to the tariffs which we're seeing at 1930s levels from America — on-shoring and production capacity, breakdown of trading relations with China as it became a bigger economic and geopolitical power. But we see that all the time: de-globalisation. We've got structural changes to labour markets, which is a bit of a catch-all.
Some of that's demographics — an ageing population. Some of it is actual deportations or threats of deportation in America, which tightens the labour markets, particularly in agriculture and hospitality. You've got massive public spending programmes of all kinds and populism, which makes it really hard to do any kind of austerity or spending cuts. You've got the heightened geopolitical risk, which obviously was part of the spike in inflation in 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine.
And you've got above all of this — and I think probably the most important one — high levels of debt and financial repression. When you've got high levels of debt, both sovereign and private sector debt, it becomes very difficult for central banks to raise interest rates to fight inflation. There's a temptation to let it rip. It's always accidental. We've got inflation targets.
They'll say sorry afterwards, but you can already see it in the debates in central banks: should they raise interest rates now to fight inflation? Or are they worried that everything's so fragile because of high levels of debt — that they should be cutting interest rates. You can already see that debate coming through. In some ways we're back to the 1970s.
So what we're seeing here is oil price shocks. And although people don't put it this way, I'm going to explain it on this slide — how even the Covid pandemic was actually an oil price shock. On the left-hand side, I've got a couple of charts that have been doing the rounds recently. They're a little bit provocative.
On the left-hand side, you can see, first of all, US CPI and then next to it, you've got UK CPI or RPI in the '70s. And what I've done is I've taken the two inflation spikes in the 1970s period of 'Spikeflation', shown in purple. And I've shifted the dates on the recent inflation spike from Covid, which is shown there in turquoise.
So it lines up with '73/'74 and, kind of roundabout, now they would be the second big inflation spike of the 1970s. Now, in the '70s, both of the inflation shocks were oil shocks. You can see in the table there the oil price at the start and the high in the Yom Kippur War. So in August '72, oil was $2.59 a barrel.
It ended up being $11.65 — it went up 4.5-fold. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 that was another big oil shock. Oil started at $12.80, ended at $41 — it tripled. Look at Covid, Ukraine, and this. You have to scratch your head here and check this is actually right. But in Covid/Ukraine it was a bigger oil shock in percentage terms, because during the lockdown oil dipped down to $20 for spot deliveries.
The futures markets at that time actually were trading at negative prices. So there was no spare capacity in terms of storage. And if you were taking delivery of oil, it was very expensive to find somewhere to put it. So you got to $20 a barrel. And then after the invasion of Ukraine, you were at $120 — so it went up six-fold.
Another energy shock. And then we've got this Iran War. We started at about $60 in December; the highest in futures trading for Brent was $118. So that's a doubling so far. Not on the scale of Yom Kippur, the Iranian Revolution, or Covid/Ukraine. But you can certainly see that pattern developing — that this could turn out to be a bigger energy shock.
And we know that the physical markets are trading at much higher prices than these futures markets — the futures markets, because they're the future expectation, are sort of slightly assuming that things don't stay this bad. But if you're trying to take spot deliveries, we've seen prices of $150 or higher.
Inflation spikes are painful for balanced funds. So this diagram looks at a big sweep of history here — looks at the last 100 years or so. On the left-hand side, it looks at the returns from US stocks and bonds. If you're in the bottom left-hand corner, you've got falling stock and bond prices, which happened in 2022.
And on that basis, it looks like it's quite a rarity. Only four times have stocks and bonds in America fallen at the same time as each other in a calendar year. But if you adjust those dots for inflation — look at real returns — there are many times when stocks and bonds fall in real terms. And if you look at the dates, you've got the Yom Kippur War in there, you've got the Iranian Revolution in there, you've got Covid in there. Periods when you get an inflation spike are bad for bonds — kind of obviously — but they're also typically very bad for stocks, especially if there's a recession.
And commodities are going up. So when we look at multi-asset portfolios — either the governed range or our GMAP funds — I'm comparing here the growth portfolio to a sort of typical passive balanced fund. On the left-hand side, you can see a 60/40 fund with really big exposures to US equities, which are quite inflation-sensitive, and to bonds. Whereas our portfolio's got a bit of balance with more in the UK — a more inflation-resilient, cheaper market.
We've got commercial property, which again is a long-term real asset. And we've got a hedge with commodities. So your first line of defence in this kind of shock is diversification including inflation hedges. That will help protect value in times when a 'Spikeflation' shock hits you. The second line of defence is to be tactical. And this is where the business cycle comes in.
And there's great uncertainty at the moment. We have a daily tactical meeting — we've just come out of it. We're all — as is everyone else — reading the latest pronouncements from the White House and from the Iranians and from the Israelis and trying to figure out what's going on before the shock happens. The investment clock that guides our asset allocation was in the top left-hand corner.
That yellow dot. You see the trail over the last 12 months or so — we were in the top left-hand corner, which is recovery and growth but inflation generally falling. We started the year thinking, actually, the earnings outlook was quite good because the economies were chugging along quite nicely. There were some improvements in business confidence, and central banks felt able to cut interest rates further.
There was lots of speculation about Fed rate cuts. Where are we going next? It's more uncertain, and you can see a bit of a projection there with the inflation rise taking you into overheat. If you've got a recession as well, we go into stagflation. So lots of debate about where we head next. Two scenarios for you.
With parallels again with history. One is Russia/Ukraine 2022 and the other is the Gulf War. When people are talking about three scenarios — just to be clear here — you can split these into as many as you like. But one of them is there's a deal, and it's possible. And if there is a deal and the war ends and you get, I guess, security guarantees for Iran that they believe, they're asking to keep their civil nuclear programme.
They're asking to keep defensive missiles — whatever defensive missiles are. And if the Americans get what they want — the Strait of Hormuz is reopened — and all the things that Iran has said don’t happen, then the markets clearly rally, oil prices go down. It's definitely possible. But it does feel a little bit at the moment that the two sides are very far apart.
And I think it's unlikely that there is a deal. So I'll leave you with two scenarios. One of them is the 'Trump goes home' scenario, which is being talked about. We don't need the oil from the Strait of Hormuz — Trump here is pretending oil is not a global market with global pricing.
Because if the Strait of Hormuz is messed up, it's going to continue to affect gasoline prices in America. But there is that scenario where Trump goes home — some kind of spectacular event, an attack — this weekend, and he says, "That's it, we're out of there. You clear it up." I think in that case, you might not get the oil price moving a lot higher, but you might not get it moving a lot lower either.
You continue to have disruptions and uncertainty. And what you can see on the left-hand graph there is 2022: the turquoise line is the oil price. And the oil price went up and it stayed high for about three or four months. And during that time, of course, it was inflationary. And stock markets shown in purple were declining. So I think you have that possible scenario, or you have something a bit more extreme where ground troops are involved, and that's more like the first Gulf War in 1990.
And stock markets dropped when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, pretty much out of the blue. And you could argue the US-Israeli attack on Iran was pretty much out of the blue — we weren't talking about it three months ago — and then the markets only really recovered when the oil price came back down again, when the war was over. We could be going into something a bit more prolonged like that, where there's lots of volatility in both directions.
But generally markets remain depressed until it's clear that the war is over. The problem we have at the moment is we don't see as clear an ending to this as you had in 1990. There was a United Nations resolution. There was a United Nations coalition. And when Saddam Hussein was back over the border from Kuwait, back in Iraq, the war was called off.
We don't see that same kind of clear ending at the moment, but those are the sorts of scenarios we're talking about. In that scenario where ground troops go in, there's more collateral damage, more lashing out by the Iranian regime at energy infrastructure — possibly a much bigger spike in oil prices. Then you worry a little bit about whether you get a recession.
So if you look historically at these oil shocks — this is the oil price in real terms — you've got here again the '70s: Yom Kippur War, Iranian Revolution; you've got the 1990 Gulf War, the Iraq War; you've got the QE and China bubble, Ukraine invasion, and Iran. All of those — one, two, three, four, five, six prior oil shocks — five of them were recessions.
The only one that wasn't was the Covid reopening. And arguably that was quite a special case in terms of where cash balances were. I'm going to stop there — we've had quite a few questions coming through. We are going to answer some questions.
Yes, perfect. Thanks so much, Melanie and Trevor. The first question we will ask here is: do you think the Bank of England still need to continue to reduce rates to protect the economy, rather than talking about holding or raising?
Yes. In short, I think pre-crisis, I was expecting the Bank of England to cut rates a bit further. And once they are a bit less worried about inflation persistence risks, I think we'll come back to that. Interesting that the question is worded in terms of — or are you thinking about does the bank think need to sort of talk about holding or, or raising rates?
Do they think interest rates talk about that? It doesn't mean you can get markets to do some of the work for you. So you actually need to do less.
Perfect.
Yes. I mean, I sort of joke that central banks have got inflation targets, but they don't use them during price level shocks because it's so painful to create the recession to reverse the increase in prices. So I say it's like dieting between meals. So, the UK inflation level should be up, what, 12% since the pandemic, but it's up 30%.
And my worry is, if there is a big inflation shock again, central banks will give lip service to fighting inflation but they will have to think about the economy as well. And that's where you need to get protection against cost of living increases through things like commodities.
Great. And still looking at the government side of things, do you think that, with government debts high, will they bring in capital controls in the UK or around the world?
Melanie Baker
No, that doesn’t seem likely to me. But look, that said, there are things governments can do — for example, from a regulatory perspective perhaps — that can encourage people to hold government debt.
Melanie Baker
So there are other forms of it — generally what we call financial repression — that can be engaged in if they really want to go down that path. But that's not really my central case.
Perfect. And which scenario are you most planning for — 'Trump goes home' or 'troops on the ground'?
I always think you've got to hold more than one scenario in our heads at a time, right? I think we're looking really at what Trump is doing, not what he's saying. And what he's saying is partly trying to keep markets as positive as possible while they're trading. I think over the long weekend we're going to see some kind of military action.
So I think we're positioned slightly short risk. So we're slightly short commodities — short equities rather, but long commodities. We were very short government bonds at the start of the year; we're now neutral. So we think government bond yields have risen so much that in a kind of 'Trump goes home' scenario, bond yields probably drop a bit; in a 'Trump goes in hard' scenario...
...there's a recession and bond yields probably drop. So we're neutral bonds at the moment. But slightly overweight commodities, underweight stocks — which I suppose is probably somewhere between 'Trump goes home but leaves things messed up' and 'Trump goes in hard and it takes weeks'.
Perfect. And to what extent could geopolitical risk in West Asia drive structural shifts in equity markets? And does this strengthen the case for investing in global funds like the MSCI?
Yes, okay. Well, I think there are structural changes happening. I do think that when this war ends, people will then look back at the US policymaking, and they'll think about the US midterm elections in November. And I think personally it'll be a flight away from the dollar again, which means gold goes stronger. If the dollar's weak, it generally helps emerging markets.
And I think there's a general theme which I believe in — which people are calling the DM-ification of emerging markets and the EM-ification of developed markets. So America's behaving more like an emerging market; emerging markets are in better shape. I think there is a shift towards the EM.
Perfect. And how exposed do you think the markets are to repricing of front-end rate expectations, if cuts are delayed further?
If cuts are delayed further? I mean, I think the question at the moment is will there be hikes, really. So I think a lot of that is now factored in. Obviously, I suppose, in that middle scenario — or the first scenario — the 'Trump goes home but leaves Hormuz mostly messed up' — that's the scenario probably with the most upside for bond yields, because it's inflationary but without an obvious end to it. But I think we're pretty neutral in terms of pricing. We think it's about right.
Perfect. And last question here: how vulnerable are equity valuations if rates stay higher for longer, particularly in parts of the market where earnings expectations remain ambitious — i.e. US tech?
Yes, right. So if we weren't talking about Iran we'd be talking about AI. The US stock market is trading on 40 times its cycle-adjusted earnings. The UK is on 20 times — so the UK is cheaper. It's the buy-one-get-one-free stock market. American equities are vulnerable just because they're expensive. And if at the same time you've got question marks about policy and you've got higher-for-longer interest rates, I think that makes them more vulnerable.
I've often been saying that feels a little bit like in the short term there could be dot-com bubble kind of dynamics around AI — in other words, the internet's a great thing, it's still all around us, but the stocks get too expensive. But I couldn't see what would burst the bubble. You needed higher rates, and this is what could give you higher rates.
So yes, I'd be a little bit nervous about US equities. And we saw the software companies getting hammered even before the Iran War came through. So a little bit nervous about the US generally.
Perfect. Well, thank you so much, Trevor and Melanie. We should wrap up there — keeping to 30 minutes. If we didn't get to your questions today, one of our sales team that you can see on the screen, reach out. Any other queries or questions, please don't hesitate to get in touch with us. And thank you all very much for joining us today.
Thanks, everyone.